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By Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann (auth.), Prof. Dr. Günter Bamberg, Prof. Dr. Klaus Spremann (eds.)

ISBN-10: 3540516751

ISBN-13: 9783540516750

ISBN-10: 3642750605

ISBN-13: 9783642750601

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Example text

Thirdly, society could encourage trust. If nowhere cooperation is starting, society can be supposed to develop and to reward behavior such as honesty, reliability, and altruism. In the literature on 26 organization, such forms of behavior are induced through the process of indoctrination: the member of the organization internalizes cooperative criteria, which replace selfishness even within the reign of managerial discretion. 3) on the hidden-effort situation can be extended in order to incorporate organizational instruments which monitor the agent and measure his effort.

Of course, the principal wants to buy some input from the agent but, unfortunately, she cannot observe how much the agent is providing and how good he is performing. In other words, the principal is assumed to be unable to observe the agent's effort decision x E X. One implication of the exogenous risk 8 is that it gives a reason for the assumed information asymmetry. If the principal is not completely ignorant, she will usually know the production function f (how her gross wealth is affected by her agent's effort and the exogenous risk), and she will know the probability distribution of 8 .

Note, however, that for some reward scheme it could happen under a particular realization of output that the actual payment is negative. In such a case, the agent were to pay the corresponding amount to the principal. In order not to exclude such schemes from further consideration, the right will be assigned to the agent to decide whether or not to accept a payment scheme. ) he declares himself willing to make an eventual transfer in the case p(y) is negative. But the agent is never supposed to make any promise with regard to his effort decision which could not be checked by the principal anyway.

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Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives by Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann (auth.), Prof. Dr. Günter Bamberg, Prof. Dr. Klaus Spremann (eds.)

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